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This paper will address the potential tension between two broadly stated policy 
objectives: one, the preservation of distinctive cultural traditions, often through the 
mechanism of formal legal rights, and two, the fostering of civic virtue, a sense of local 
community and the advancement of common civic enterprises.   
Many political liberals have argued that liberal societies have an obligation to 
accommodate the cultural traditions of various sub groups through legal rights and a 
redistribution of social resources.  The “right to cultural difference” is now widely (if 
not universally) understood to be a basic human right, on par with rights to religious 
liberty and racial equality. 
Other theorists writing in the liberal, civic republican, and urban sociology traditions 
have expounded on the necessity of civic virtue, community and common enterprises 
initiated and executed at the local or municipal level of government or private 
association.  These theorists have argued that common projects, shared norms and social 
trust are indispensable elements of effective democratic government and are necessary 
to the altruism and public spiritedness that in turn secure social justice. 
These two policy goals therefore may at times be in conflict.  This conflict is especially 
severe in larger culturally diverse cities, where social trust and civic virtue are most 
needed and often in shortest supply.  Policies designed to counter cosmopolitan 
alienation and anomie by fostering civic virtue, social trust and common social norms 
will inevitably conflict with the cultural traditions and sub group identification of some 
minority groups.  Accommodation of any and all sub group cultural practices will make 
it difficult if not impossible to foster a common civic culture and social trust.   
Programmatically speaking, the paper will argue that such conflicts are often best 
confronted on the field of political debate and policy analysis, not in the language of 
civil rights.  Rights discourse, with its inherent absolutism, is ill suited to the type of 
subtle trade offs that these conflicts often entail.  While local government and public 
institutions must be sensitive to the needs of all cultural groups that they affect, the need 
for civic enterprise and social trust should not be subject to absolute and non negotiable 
demands for the accommodation of cultural traditions.  The accommodation of some 
cultural traditions will impose severe costs in terms of strife, conflict and the inability 
effectively to pursue other important social goals—in at least some cases, the cultural 
traditions, and not the other social goals, should yield. 
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The Problematic: Rights to Cultural Difference and Civic Virtue 
 
 Avishai Margalit and Moshe Halbertal begin their essay: Liberalism and the Right to 
Culture with this sentence:  “Human Beings have a right to culture—not just any culture, 
but their own.”1 The rest of the essay is concerned, not with defending this proposition, 
but with exploring how it might be put into practice. This is only one example of a very 
widely held conviction.  For many, one of the most crucial imperatives of a multicultural 
society is what one might call a “right to culture.”  Many argue that the statement in 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights,“ everyone has the right to 
participate in the cultural life of the community,” entails a right to cultural difference: the 
right of ethnic and cultural sub groups to retain and perpetuate the practices, norms and 
mores of their culture. 
A right to culture may be a rhetorical figure meant to signal a significant ideological 
commitment.  As an ideological commitment, the right to culture may take the form of a 
general commitment to learn about and respect the cultural traditions of various culturally 
distinct groups in a society.  It would counsel tolerance of cultural difference and an 
embrace of a multicultural society; it would stand in opposition to the policies of national 
assimilation that have so often characterized the nation states of the West.   This strikes 
me as a sensible (though not unassailable) ideological commitment; it is not the focus on 
my discussion herein.  
Often, however, the term “right” is not meant loosely or figuratively; indeed a 
number of governments or quasi governmental organizations have adopted formal “rights 
to culture” that anticipate some institutional enforcement mechanism: litigation, 
administrative dispute resolution, or formal sanctions.   
This suggests a vague but pervasive ideological commitment, backed by a embryonic 
jurisprudence.  Here, “culture” is understood to be an important value that decent 
societies must protect against infringement or dilution, and it is urged that the formal 
power of government should be deployed in the service of such protection. 
Formally, we can imagine two broad categories of activity or regulation that might be 
invalidated by a right to culture: “public” regulation promulgated by the state—law and 
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legislation—and “private” regulations or policies of certain actors in the institutions of 
the market economy (typically such laws might apply to employers, private 
universities and schools, landlords and proprietors of public accommodations 
such as restaurants, theaters and hotels).  The former might be described as 
rights-against-government and the latter as rights-against private institutions. 
Normatively it may matter a great deal whether the right in question is good against 
government or against private actors. 
There are other complexities.  For instance, it will not be at all an easy matter to 
determine which group practices are considered “culture” for purposes of legal 
enforcement of a right to culture.  In the broadest sense any social practice that is not 
universally shared among humankind is a product of “culture.”  “Culture” include 
practices that are relatively trivial and unworthy of judicial attention as well as practices 
that are potentially socially destructive.  The American custom of drinking coffee (too 
often bad coffee) with milk or cream along with dessert rather than espresso coffee after 
dessert is “culture” and so are the American practices of capital punishment and wide 
availability of firearms.   A formal right to culture cannot employ such a capacious 
definition of culture, yet practical, working definitions of culture are surprisingly scarce. 
These cavils aside, my primary concern herein is that cultural rights and especially 
the ideas about group difference and culture on which they often are premised may be 
socially destructive in the context of a relatively small and interdependent democratic 
institution such as a city.  This is a different matter than saying that the cultural practices 
of certain “cultural minorities” are per se socially destructive, as I will make clear.   
My working hypothesis is that multicultural cities are the vital site of a potentially 
creative and also potentially destructive tension.  They are multicultural on the one hand: 
polyglot, cosmopolitan, fractured into sub groups by race, ethnicity, custom, economic 
class and ideology.  This suggests an inevitable divergence of opinions, experiences and 
ways of life, a divergence that will nurture sub group affiliations and loyalties at the 
expense of understanding, trust and familiarity across the sub groups.  They are cities on 
the other hand: the customary location of small scale, if not face-to-face, participatory 
democracy.  The city-state of the middle ages and Renaissance, the early American town 
studied by Alexis de Tocqueville and the regional governments of the Italian federalist   3
reform of the 1970s all suggest the importance of smaller, more manageable and more 
participatory forms of government.  And a crucial feature of this smaller scale 
government is social trust—precisely what the fragmentation of multiculturalism can 
make difficult to achieve and at worst unavailable.   
 
The Value of Civic Enterprise: 
 
In a (perhaps romanticized) past, great cities inspired collective pride and one of the 
functions of city government was to encourage citizens to participate in great common 
projects to the benefit of all.  People remarked in admiration and awe at public projects 
such as bridges, subways, parks, waterways, ports and civic buildings.  People beamed 
with pride at civic culture: museums, public events and the lively arts.    
But today any ambitious public project is immediately bogged down in ideological 
conflict that is often fatal: How can you celebrate Columbus when he was a imperialist 
who smoothed the way for the oppression of indigenous peoples?  How can you be proud 
of destroying the natural landscape to build a dam, bridge or a freeway?  How can you 
justify spending public money on the bourgeois Opera or Museum of Fine Arts when 
grass roots folk music/feminist free verse poetry/ ethnic interpretive dance languishes for 
lack of support?   
These questions, and many others like them, are good questions that need to be asked.  
But too often, we are quick to point out the inevitable incompleteness or bias of any 
public vision and slow to notice the erosion of the public sphere that comes from no 
vision or an anti-vision.   Without such collective projects and social vision we are 
without any sense of participation in the civic life of the cities in which we live. 
  But of course, explicit public vision comes with certain risks.  Utopian urban 
planning, for instance, has often ignored urban diversity and the vibrancy of city street 
life, imposing instead a uniform, theoretically pure master plan that crushed anything it 
could not assimilate.  Literally scores of authors have commented on the destructive 
“purity” of modernist city planning.  The exemplary prototype was Baron Haussmann’s 
remaking of Parisian neighborhoods during France’s Second Empire, through which the 
winding pathways of old Paris (and the buildings that lined them) were made to yield to   4
the grand boulevards that grace the city of Light today.2   More recent examples have 
remade the American urban landscape: Robert Moses’s freeways cut swatches through 
working class immigrant neighborhoods in New York City3; the urban renewal of the 
1960 displaced the thriving African-American Fillmore district in San Francisco, the 
Latino communities of downtown Los Angeles were literally pushed East to make way 
for the corporate headquarters of the West Coast’s business and finance capitol.4  Le 
Corbusier’s modernist plan for Paris was (mercifully) never realized, but a visit to 
Styvusant Town in New York City would make one think that the Ville Radieuse5 had 
found a home in the New World.  Some of these civic visions are of such inspired beauty 
that one cannot help but think it worth the loss (marvel at Place de Concorde and tell me 
you long for the fetid labyrinth of medieval Paris); others are a crime against the social 
fabric and an assault on the eye; still others simply incomplete and abandoned, a betrayal 
of the public trust and an insult to the lives they displaced.  
But the attempts to control such civic enterprises by tying the hands of government 
have not eliminated the type of violent displacement that the critics of utopian planning 
deplore.  Instead, the displacement now occurs under the guise of “efficiency, ” or the 
market, rather than under the rubric of progress or urban beautification.  The imperialism 
now occurs through market forces and malign neglect: shopping malls and office 
complexes replace highways and public works as the engines of displacement; the 
corporate headquarters as a monument to capital replaces the public sculpture as a 
monument to the civic hero or heroine.  While modern urban planning threatened to 
destroy communities in the name of the Ville Radieuse, today the ethnic neighborhood is 
slowly destroyed through disinvestment and neglect or displaced by gentrification and 
spiraling rents: housing abandonment or condominium conversions replace the wrecking 
ball and the bulldozer of urban renewal.   
In the United States, a combination of left wing skepticism of “cultural imperialism” 
and neo–conservative hostility to government enterprise generally have combined to 
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discredit many civic projects. But the retreat from governmental planning and civic 
vision has not left the city “free” to develop naturally or in response to organic social 
groups and social interactions.  Instead, when civic vision has been abandoned, the state 
has quietly ceded the field to a destructive clash of covert plans and anti-plans: the 
acquisitive frenzy of the real estate speculator and the reactionary populism of the selfish 
or frightened homeowner. 
What is needed, then, is not a return to imperialistic planning, but a new if tentative 
vision.  A vision that is coherent, yet open to revision, a vision that is confident, but not 
arrogant, a vision that is inspiring but does not descend into demagoguery.  Such a vision 
is not imposed from above, but rather is assembled, piece by piece from the fragments of 
our collective aspirations and ideals. 
 
The Common Good? 
Cities need common enterprises and civic vision in order to be livable cities.  They 
also need common civic enterprises and a belief in “the common good” in order to be 
effective local democracies according to a significant number of social scientists and 
political theorists.  Consider the following statement from the political science Robert 
Putnam:  
 
In the civic community… citizens pursue what Tocqueville termed “self 
interest properly understood, that is, self interested defined in the context 
of broader public needs, self interest that is “enlightened” rather than 
“myopic, “ self interest that is alive to the interests of others.  [By contrast] 
[t]he absence of civic virtue is exemplified in…“amoral 
familism”…”Maximize the material, short-term advantage of the nuclear 
family; assume all others will do like-wise…. Citizens in a civic 
community, though not selfless saints, regard the public domain as more 
than a battleground for pursuing personal interest.6 
 
Civic virtue’s enlightened self interest requires a commitment to a public sphere and 
public values shared by all, or at least the vast majority of citizens.   Divergence of 
opinions and views are to be expected, but at the same time there must be some 
conception of the common good that is widely shared.  We may disagree about whether 
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to prioritize, say, public education over police.  We may fight to the bitter end over the 
issue.  But we need to share some at least vague sense of what would make ours a “better 
city” (better public education and more effective police).  Things would become much 
more problematic if a significant group of citizens thought children should learn on the 
job as apprentices or if a large faction thought crime prevention better left to private 
vigilantes.   They would be worse yet if some people didn’t care about education at all or 
sided with the criminals on the belief that private property is immoral.  In these latter 
cases, we would not have routine political disputes and divergent preferences—precisely 
what a well functioning government and a free market are supposed to mediate—but 
rather something like a radical disjuncture in terms of the grammar in which the common 
good is imagined.   
Even if each group perceives its goals as compatible with its conception of the 
common good, outsiders may (mis)perceive those goals as a reflection of what Putnam 
calls “amoral familism”.  Lack of understanding and real, at times radical, divergence in 
conceptions of the good may erode public trust, encourage citizens to abandon public 
virtue and instead “maximize the material, short-term advantage of the nuclear family” 
(or ethnic group) while also promoting the self fulfilling view that  “all others will do the 
same.”  Multiculturalism in its stronger manifestations seems to threaten this, and 
multicultural rights, in their stronger manifestations threaten to entrench it. 
 
Rights Assertion and the Habits of Citizenship. 
Consider another of Putnam’s findings:  
Citizenship in the civic community entails equal rights and obligations for 
all.  Such a community is bound together by horizontal relations of 
reciprocity and cooperation, not by vertical relations of authority and 
dependency.  Citizens interact as equals, not as patrons and clients nor as 
governors and petitioners.7 
 
In the classical liberal model, rights are a precondition to effective citizenship: civil rights 
secure the political equality of citizens that distinguishes democracy from aristocracy and 
civil liberties allow citizens participate in politics without fear of reprisals from the 
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individuals currently in control of the formal power of the state.  In this model, formal 
rights assertion against government or private actors should be extraordinary.  For the 
most part, rights should function in the background, as guarantors of equality and liberty 
whose effectiveness is reflected in the fact that they rarely need be evoked formally.  
When this is true, we needn’t pay much attention to the effects of formal rights assertion 
on the “habits of citizenship”.   
But multicultural rights are predicated on the political powerlessness of minority cultural 
groups: because the minority groups are likely to be the victims of illegitimate bias, their 
legitimate interests are likely to be systematically undervalued by most citizens.  Here 
rights are not a background norm underlying democratic politics, but instead a corrective 
to a failed or degenerate democracy, as a fix for “process failure” in the language of legal 
theorist John Hart Ely.  In this “process failure” model, rights assertion becomes an 
alternative to democracy for groups who are likely to systematic losers in majoritarian 
politics.   As such, rights assertion may become a frequent event in the collective life of 
these sub groups and these groups may come to define their role as citizens, primarily in 
terms of the act of rights assertion before courts, rather than as participants in political 
dialogue with other citizens.  At this point we may worry, in Putnam’s terms, that the 
“horizontal relations of reciprocity and cooperation” necessary to good citizenship will 
become supplanted by “vertical relations of authority and dependency” between subjects 
dependent on the authority of courts or governmental bureaucracies that enforce rights to 
culture.  
This isn’t to suggest that minority rights are never necessary; indeed such rights are 
essential to realize the promise of multicultural cities, as I will argue below.  But minority 
rights must not become a substitute for engagement with the rough and tumble of 
democratic politics.  Political dialogue empowers members of minority sub groups as 
equal participants in a political process and thereby fosters horizontal relationships 
among citizens rather than vertical relationships between individuals and the 
administrative or judicial institutions that enforce rights to culture.   Political dialogue can 
be an opportunity to foster mutual trust between the ethnic groups which make up a city; 
by negotiating cultural differences, groups may come to understand that group based 
differences are not as severe as they imagined and that members of other ethnic groups   8
are people of good will who can be enlisted in mutually beneficial enterprises for the 
common good.   
This leads us to another of Putnam’s observations: 
Participation in civic organizations inculcates skills of cooperation as well 
as a sense of shared responsibility for collective endeavors.  Moreover, 
when individuals belong to “cross-cutting” groups with diverse goals and 
members, their attitudes will tend to moderate as a result of group 
interaction and cross pressures… associationism is a necessary 
precondition for effective self-governance.8 
 
Political organizing around specific social practices, rather than litigation asserting 
rights to “culture”, might foster coalitional politics and the “cross cutting” group 
membership that Putnam and others suggest will help produce more moderate attitudes.  
For instance, recent immigrants might ally themselves with local religious minorities in 
order to lobby for, say the accommodation of distinctive apparel in public schools (as was 
at issue in the famous French “affair of the head scarves” in which French school 
authorities forbade the wearing of headscarves and other religious dress in public school), 
or with organized labor to press for a generally applicable autonomy over grooming and 
dress or for flexible work schedules (to accommodate religious or cultural rituals or 
traditions) in employment contexts.  In the process they will often need to compromise in 
order to maintain a successful alliance.   Such a compromise is more likely to 
experienced as voluntarily chosen in the way many politically necessary compromises are 
(“on balance, the compromise was worth it”) leading to the mediation of attitudes Putnam 
describes.  By contrast, if a court offers a compromise (say, in the form of a limited 
cultural rights protection) it may be experienced by the group as a betrayal of their “true” 
culture or even as a form of compulsory assimilation imposed by a judicial system that is, 
after all, thoroughly implicated in the norms of the dominant culture. 
 
“Cultural Difference” as a Threat to Civic Dialogue and Sound Policy 
What is important to notice is that none of the problems I have identified make 
reference to the specific features of any cultural tradition.  The claim here is not that 
certain cultural traditions are incompatible with democracy, capitalism or political 
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liberalism because, for instance, they’re too hierarchical, too theocratic, too communal 
and therefore fail to respect individual autonomy, disregard the equality of women, etc. 
As a general matter I often find such claims wildly overbroad, alarmist, inattentive to 
similarities between the “alien” practices and values and readily available analogous 
Western practices and values and quite often just plain bigoted, (although, in certain 
contexts, the claims strike me as quite plausible.) For my purposes in this essay I’m 
agnostic as to these claims.  
My claim is that the mere perception of cultural difference and the resulting social 
divisions—objective and imagined—can trouble democratic institutions and enterprises 
that require social trust and even a thin commitment to shared ideals.   At the same time 
there may be somewhat less than meets the eye to the crisis multiculturalism presents in 
terms of conflicts involving actual social practices (as opposed to widespread perceptions 
of difference.)   To be sure, modern cities consist of people with divergent goals, ideals 
and conceptions of the good life, but this is type of conflict that liberal democratic 
institutions are designed to mediate  My hypothesis is that perception of group cultural 
difference—a sort of “difference panic” on the part of some and fetishization and 
valorization of group difference on the part of others-- may be much more destructive of 
civic enterprises than the normative conflict generated the actual practices of various 
social groups.  If so, then the discourse surrounding “multicultural rights” may be a part 
of the problem, not so much because multicultural rights “go too far” (or because 
opposition to cultural rights is unacceptably intolerant) but because the arguments for and 
against cultural rights share a socially destructive and at least overblown (if not 
downright incorrect) presumption: that “cultural” conflict is novel and unprecedented 
because, unlike garden variety forms of social conflict, cultural conflict involves a clash 
of radically divergent, incompatible, mutually inscrutable and incommensurable value 
systems. 
Cultural difference rhetoric (pro and con) encourages us to see social conflicts in 
terms of inscrutable group difference.  But often, conflicts filed under the label “cultural 
difference” are better understood in terms of the type of ideological or normative conflict 
that democracies and markets routinely mediate.   Often the reason a social practice in 
another culture is disturbing is because it is uncomfortably similar to a controversial   10
practice internal to “our own” culture.  In these cases, practices that could be dealt with 
under existing laws and procedures are unnecessarily complicated by the introduction of 
a rhetoric of cultural difference. 
For instance, the ongoing public outcry over female circumcision is generally 
presented as a case of “cultural difference.”  The rhetoric evokes traditional cultural and 
religious values in need of protection from “western cultural imperialism” or, 
alternatively, savage African or brutal Islamic practices that the “civilized world” should 
unite to combat.  This framing, encouraged by both those who would defend the practice 
(or practices) as “cultural traditions” and those who would forbid them as barbaric, 
clouds the issue and blind us to reasonable policy solutions.   
For instance, when doctors in Seattle area hospitals began encountering requests for 
female circumcision from Somali immigrants in the mid 1990s, the hospitals formed a 
committee to study the issue.  The committee found that refusal to consider performing 
the practice would lead many to attempt to perform it outside the hospital setting, either 
at home or in their native country, both options that would often involve severe 
procedures under unsanitary conditions.  By contrast, the committee discovered that a 
quite small ritual cut in the tissue surrounding the clitoris would satisfy the Somalis 
cultural and religious needs while leaving only small scar and resulting in little or no long 
term loss of sensation, sexual function or lasting physical trauma.  An obstetrician/ 
gynecologist opined that such a procedure would be less traumatic than the male 
circumcisions performed as a matter of course on new-born boys in the United States.9  
A form of civic dialogue that emerged in a local context in which the conflict actually 
arose and that focused on the specific practice at issue, rather on sweeping ideas of 
cultural difference, enabled the Somalis and the American doctors arrive at a solution that 
satisfied both Somali traditions and American norms and laws. 
Nevertheless, driven by the fear of a “barbaric” (this term was used to describe the 
Somalis with shocking confidence and regularity) foreign culture, opponents lobbied for 
and secured the passage a sweeping federal law that arguably prohibits any form of 
“female circumcision.  The federal law potentially undermines the hard won compromise 
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hammered out by at least one community that was directly involved in the conflict.  It 
fails to discriminate between a symbolic procedure that satisfies the religious and cultural 
traditions of a group of citizens while causing less trauma than other procedures that are 
routinely performed in the United States and a potentially life threatening procedure that 
at its worst severely interferes with healthy biological function and condemns the woman 
a life of pain and disfigurement. 
Do we need the new federal law to prohibit the more severe form of female 
circumcision?   The answer is no because every jurisdiction in the United States has 
generally applicable laws against child abuse and endangerment.  If the practice amounts 
to child abuse the abusers can and should be prosecuted under those laws.  Viewed as a 
child endangerment issue, the practice is similar to the refusal of certain Christian 
denominations, such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses to allow medical interventions for ill 
children, an issue that has been confronted and mediated by American medical 
professionals and courts.10  Like the Jehovah’s Witnesses, many of the practitioners of 
female circumcision believe their religion requires it. 11   In both cases the children 
arguably are not capable of freely choosing or rejecting the religious practices of their 
parents.    
One cannot help but wonder whether what is really so disquieting is not the supposed 
radical difference but rather the striking similarity between this cultural practice and the 
practices that regularly occur in the West.  For instance, children with “irregular” genitals 
are routinely operated on in the United States, for no reason other than aesthetics (one of 
the reasons cited by the African practitioners of female circumcision.)12   Male infants in 
the United States are routinely circumcised despite the  consensus that the practice has no 
clear medical justification.  And consider the types of bodily “mutilation” (anorexia, 
bulimia, a growing number of  cosmetic surgeries) that Western women regularly endure, 
again, in order to conform to the gender norms of their culture.   
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This example demonstrates that the rhetoric of “cultural difference” that cultural 
rights discourse encourages doesn’t necessarily lead to the preservation of minority 
cultural practices. It can lead us either to turn a blind eye to a practice that we should 
confront and condemn (“it’s  ‘their culture’ and therefore not our concern”) or to 
prematurely condemn a practice we should seek to understand (“it’s ‘barbaric’  and an 
assault on our values.”)   Regardless of whether one favors or opposes the practice in 
question, little is gained by shrouding a social practice in the rhetoric of “cultural 
difference,” a rhetoric that too often suggests that we are incapable of evaluating the 
practice in a context specific way, as we would any other social practice.   We should 
confront disquieting and controversial practices in their specifics as a practices that occur 
in our society, rather than attempt to establish a distance from them by describing them as 
alien and foreign. 
Cultural differences in and of themselves do not pose a threat to the type of civic 
dialogue that theorists such as Putnam see as central to making local democracy work.  
What does pose a threat to civic dialogue is the belief that “culture” provides an excuse to 
opt out of the dialogue and resort to premature defiance or premature coercion.  We can 
and we must engage in dialogue (and when necessary face conflict) concerning social 
practices about which people will differ.  In this sense, “cultural difference” is simply the 
latest manifestation of that most ancient political dilemma: how can a just society manage 
desires of citizens with incompatible visions of the good?13 
 
Mediation of Cultural Conflict Through Political Dialogue 
Notice how the tensions between cultural difference and civic virtue are attenuated by 
describing the conflicts in terms of a clash of values, goals and practices instead of in 
terms of inscrutable group cultures.  Conceived of in the former, more universal terms, 
what once were seen as inscrutable foreign practices may instead be seen to involve 
commitments and norms which other members of a community can understand, if not 
embrace.  So rather than see clitoretectomy as an effect of a foreign culture that is beyond 
our comprehension, we can see it as a controversial social practice, mild in some of its 
manifestations, severe in others, and arguably analogous to some more familiar practices, 
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such as cosmetic surgery or male circumcision.  Instead of a clash of incommensurable 
values, we are faced with a political disagreement susceptible to resolution through the 
normal institutions of liberal societies: political dialogue, negotiation and persuasion.    
Political dialogue and negotiation can reveal the diversity of opinion within sub 
groups that may seem unanimous at first glance: for instance, there are indigenous 
feminist movements within many ethnic and religious groups struggling to resist 
“traditional” practices that undermine equality between the sexes; there are intense and 
compelling struggles over the appropriate interpretation of religious doctrine and the 
traditional status of many practices, there are more and less cosmopolitan elements within 
most ethnic groups and more and less progressive views regarding traditional practices.  
Cultural rights might bolster a practice that is under attack within an ethnic group and 
thereby unwittingly take sides in an “internal” dispute; by contrast, an effective political 
dialogue can allow such divergent voices within cultural groups a platform from which to 
speak, in some cases lessening the apparent tension between the norms of various groups 
in a society and facilitating a richer and more nuanced understanding of group cultural 
practices.  
Political dialogue can be an opportunity for groups to come to understand each other 
and may help the group that loses a political conflict better accept the outcome.  In some 
cases a group that fails to convince its fellow citizens of the merits of a cultural practice 
may come away somewhat more receptive to a generally applicable prohibition if their 
members were involved a conversation about the rationale for the prohibition.  Political 
dialogue can educate recent immigrants as to the norms and values that are dominant in 
their new or temporary homes; in many cases newcomers are happy to comply with 
social norms when they know of and understand them.  
Consider the following case.  Two arranged marriages involving two girls of 13 and 
14 years and two men roughly twice their age took place in the state of Nebraska14.   
After local law enforcement was informed of the incident, the father of the two girls, a 
refugee from Iraq, was charged with criminal child abuse and the grooms, fellow Iraqis, 
were charged with statutory rape for consummating the “marriages” on their wedding 
                                                 
14 Don Terry, Cultural Tradition and Law Collide in Middle America, The New York Times, Dec 2, 1996, 
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night.  The girls were taken into the protective custody of the state.  The lawyer for the 
Iraqi men reported that none of them could understand why they were arrested: they were 
simply unaware that the marriage was illegal and that sexual intercourse between 
“married” minors and adults was considered criminal sexual assault.  According to a 
friend of the accused men, “They were only doing what we have done for centuries.  This 
is not a case of disrespect for the law.  We did not know the law.”  Another friend who 
became a sort of unofficial spokesperson for the accused men added “But now that we 
know there will be no more incidents.  We love this country.” 
Perhaps this reaction is a ruse to avoid criminal penalties.  But on its face, the reaction 
suggests that what might appear to be an intractable cultural conflict may instead be a 
simple question of “ignorance of the law,” easily resolved through education.   And 
although at first blush the practice of the Iraqi refugees may seem a radical departure 
from Western practices, it bears noting that the legal age of consent for sexual intercourse 
is as low as 14 in some parts of the United States and the legal age for marriage is also as 
low as 14 if the marriage takes place with parental consent: in other words, for the older 
of the two girls both the marriage and the sexual intercourse charged as child abuse and 
statutory rape in Nebraska would have been legal in other parts of the United States.  And 
as a consequence of the American constitutional principle that the laws of any state be 
given “full faith and credit” in other states, a couple legally married in any state generally 
remains married in any other state of the union, even if the marriage in question could not 
be entered into under the laws of the new state.  
There are good reasons to think that a marriage involving a 14 year old is 
problematic.  But it is not clear why it is more problematic when it arises from the 
traditions of rural Iraqis than when it arises from the traditions of rural Americans.   The 
Nebraska controversy raised difficult legal and moral issues, but none of the issues were 
unprecedented or unique to “multiculturalism.” Multicultural rhetoric led the media and 
local law enforcement into a sort of “difference panic.”  Viewed through lens of cultural 
difference, the practice could only be seen as the effect of an inscrutable foreign culture.  
At this point only two options are cognizable: protect the practice under the rubric of 
cultural autonomy, or prohibit it as inconsistent with the norms of Western civilization.  
Either outcome is destructive of social trust because either outcome reinforces the idea   15
that the sub-group is radically distinct from the “mainstream” of society, they are in but 
never of the local and national community.  Viewed through this lens, the sub group is 
either a candidate for liberal noblesse oblige manifested in cultural rights or for isolation 
and suspicion as a foreign contagion that threatens the community character. 
If, by contrast, the local Nebraska authorities had viewed the practice of underage 
“marriages” without prejudice, several equitable solutions suggest themselves.  First and 
most obviously, take pains to educate newcomers of the applicable marriage and statutory 
rape laws.  More controversially, exercise case-by-case prosecutorial discretion in dealing 
with child endangerment/abuse and statutory rape violations that involve good faith 
mistakes about the governing legal norms.  The maxim “ignorance of the law is no 
excuse” is routinely honored in the breach: to be blunt, I find it hard to imagine that an 
identical fact pattern involving people of European decent from a state where marriages 
between 14 year olds are legal with parental consent would have resulted in prosecutions 
for rape and child abuse.  Instead, I suspect the parties would have been informed of the 
governing law, told that the marriage was invalid under Nebraska law and advised to 
either wait until the daughters reached the age of majority in Nebraska or to travel to 
North Carolina, marry under that state’s law and then return (Nebraska might then 
recognize the marriage under the full faith and credit clause and the practice of comity 
between the American states.)   
Finally, and again more controversially, enforce the governing law and prosecute 
willful violations accordingly.  Newcomers have the right to expect that they will be 
treated equitably and they have the right to attempt to change laws they find inappropriate 
or burdensome through the political process.  They don’t have the right to expect 
established laws, norms and mores to change to suit them or to demand exceptions to 
generally applicable rules.  In this respect, the adage, “when in Rome, do as the Romans 
do” is apt: for the most part, people who arrive in a new social environment legitimately 
can be expected to conform their behavior to established norms.  Cultural traditions can 
and do change in response to new circumstances and social expectations.   Such a process 
of change is not necessarily a violation of rights or an instance of cultural imperialism.  In 
this respect it is worthy of note that according to observers of Iraqi society, marriages 
involving teen-age girls are by and large limited to rural areas and very rare in Iraqi   16
cities: if rural Iraqis can adapt their marital practices to the dominant cultural norms of 
Baghdad, they can also adapt them to the dominant norms of Lincoln, Nebraska and other 
Western cities. 
 
Status-based Discrimination as an Impediment to Successful Integration 
Although it would require a separate essay to even summarize the argument, it is long 
established in liberal societies that there is a relevant distinction between discrimination 
on the basis of status or group membership and “discrimination” on the basis of behavior 
or practices.  While discrimination based on status is understood to be illegitimate with 
rare exceptions, in a sense, discrimination on the basis of behavior is the sine qua non of 
law.  My suggestion that formal cultural rights  (in the form of demands for 
accommodation of distinctive practices) should be approached with caution and attention 
to the potential costs in terms of civic trust does not suggest circumspection toward more 
traditional civil rights prohibiting discrimination on the basis of ascriptive social statuses 
such as race and national origin. 
Indeed, in some instances, the commitment to group cultural difference may be a 
reaction to the failure of liberal societies to confront and eliminate bias and 
discrimination on the basis of race or national origin.  Consider a conflict over arranged 
marriage reported several years ago in the New York Times.15  The Times covered the 
story of the son of a Turkish immigrant to Denmark who consented to an arranged 
marriage at the behest of his parents.  The largely assimilated son married a native 
Turkish woman and eventually the couple settled in Denmark.  The cultural gulf between 
the relatively westernized husband and his traditional wife made the relationship 
impossible.  Ultimately, the husband divorced his traditional wife in order to marry a 
more assimilated woman of Turkish decent who, like him, had grown up in Denmark.   
This caused a great deal of animosity between the husband and his own extended family 
and between the husband’s family, the first wife’s family and the second wife’s family 
(all of whom hailed from or lived in the same small village in Turkey.) 
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The aftermath of this story sounds a cautionary note: one might expect that, “having 
suffered at the hands of old Turkish custom, the young, bruised couple [the son and his 
second wife], both Danish citizens, should be enthusiastic supporters of their adoptive 
land and its campaign to bring ‘Danish culture’ to all, including the more than 8 percent 
of inhabitants who are immigrants.”  But the young couple complain of discrimination in 
employment and note with dismay that ”there is always the sense of “us” and “them,” the 
old Dane and the new Dane, the blue-eyed and the dark-skinned” and that “the Danes say 
one thing, that they want to integrate us, and do another.  That’s why we fight.”  
These statements suggest that robust prohibitions against discrimination on the basis 
of statuses such as race, religion and national origin may be a precondition to effective 
social integration and necessary to foster social trust between ethnic and cultural groups.  
They also suggest that compromise and negotiation of the conflicts surrounding cultural 
practices are possible: if offered a consistent message and a realizable goal, recent 
immigrants would be happy in many cases to integrate into a multicultural society, even 
at the expense of some traditional practices. 
 
Assimilation and the Promise of Multicultural Cities 
At this point it bears noting that some degree of assimilation is arguably an 
indispensable component of modern nationalism generally, whether it involves “foreign” 
cultural practices or not.  For instance, long before the French attempted to Gallicize their 
Algerian colonial subjects French elites Parisian-ized the French peasantry, repressing 
local dialects and rewarding fluency in Parisian French, incorporating certain local 
customs into a unified national identity and discouraging others.16  This is a standard 
story of nationalism generally, and applies to some degree to most nation states.  This 
does not of course, serve as an apology for French (or any other) colonialism, but it does 
cast the problem of assimilation in a useful historical frame: to a real extent almost all of 
the world’s currently existing cultures are the product of assimilation.  It is 
understandable but perhaps wrongheaded to presume that the processes of cultural 
melding that produced the civilizations we enjoy today should stop with the present 
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generation.  Perhaps the difference between the type of successful, if partial, assimilation 
that is at the heart of national unification and the so far unsuccessful assimilation of 
contemporary multiculturalism is precisely that of racism and status hierarchy. 
Recall that the foregoing analysis doesn’t rely on reference to any specific cultural 
practice or norm: the claim is not that certain cultural traditions are incompatible with 
democracy or capitalism and political liberalism because, for instance, they’re too 
hierarchical, too theocratic, too communal, disregard the equality of women, etc.  Instead, 
it’s the perception of cultural difference as an unprecedented phenomenon involving 
radically alien practices and inscrutable beliefs that threatens social trust and the 
conditions favorable to civic virtue.  My argument doesn’t suggest that cultural rights are 
dangerous because they protect inherently dangerous practices, but rather that they are 
dangerous because they are premised on the view that conflicts involving practices 
identified with ethnic sub-groups are distinct from the run-of-the-mill political and 
ideological conflicts that complex societies routinely confront.  Cultural rights presume 
that group cultural differences are fixed and therefore the inevitable basis of social 
division.  Based on this presumption, they foreclose many of the numerous mechanisms 
that well ordered societies possess for dealing with normative and social conflicts and for 
mediating, complicating and softening group based affiliations, biases and divisions. 
It is consistent with this argument that social trust in multicultural cities could emerge 
either through sufficient assimilation of cultural minorities to currently dominant customs 
and values, or through sufficient assimilation of all members of the community to some 
common set of norms and values that would represent an amalgamation of previously 
distinct and alien customs and values.  This latter ideal—a polyglot civic community—is, 
to my mind, the great, unfulfilled cosmopolitan promise of multicultural cities.  This 
cultural intermarriage and the new artistic, creative and social forms it might produce is 
what the multicultural city has to offer the multicultural nation state and ultimately the 
multicultural world: new ways of imagining community and new ways of living together 
that bridge— and at times transcend—cultural group difference. 
Sound utopian?  Well, I do use the term assimilation, and I use it advisedly.  I don’t 
imagine we can have the kind of multicultural civic community I’ve described without 
some changes; changes that some will find unwelcome.  Some sacred cows would have   19
to be butchered, some ritual daggers pounded into ploughshares.  And while the polyglot 
society would to some extent be mix of all the various cultures in a society, let’s not fool 
ourselves: there’s simply no way to guarantee that each group will have equal influence.  
Larger groups, more established groups and groups with disproportionate economic and 
social influence will have more power to shape the direction of a common multicultural 
society than recent immigrants with little wealth or social prestige.  From the perspective 
of cultural rights, this is an injustice; I fear it is an injustice law and social policy cannot 
easily remedy. 
Moreover, much of what animates cultural rights is the desire for group self-
perpetuation: it not simply a desire to have equal influence over a polyglot society but a 
desire to remain distinctive.  It’s not an accident that all of the examples of cultural 
conflicts I’ve offered have involved marriage, procreation, children or sexuality.   These 
issues are of central importance because they involve more than simple conflicts between 
legally competent, adults; they also involve a struggle over the affiliations and 
socialization of future generations. They are about the future of societies, the continuity 
of civilizations and the survival of ethnic groups as groups.  
For instance, arranged marriage is an especially potent symbol of multicultural 
conflict because it implicates a practice that is valued not only for its own sake but also as 
a means of maintaining a common group identity.   For some immigrant communities, 
arranged marriage may take on greater importance in the host country than it ever had “at 
home” because without it there would be no certain means of ensuring a connection 
between subsequent generations born in the West and the old country.  The stakes of the 
conflict are “cultural survival.”  As the philosopher Anthony Appiah argues:   
the desire for survival is not simply the desire that the culture that gives meaning 
to the lives of currently existing individuals should continue for them, but 
requires the continued existence of the culture through indefinite future 
generations…. Let me stress first that the indefinite future generations in question 
should be the descendants of the current population.  The desire for the survival 
of the… identity is not the desire that there should always be people somewhere 
who speak that …language and practice those … practices… A proposal to 
[pay]… a group of unrelated people to carry on [the] culture on some island in 
the South Pacific simply would not meet the need.     20
This matters because it seems to me not at all clear that this aim is one that we 
can acknowledge while respecting the autonomy of future generations.17 
 
Arranged marriage is perhaps an emblematic multicultural conflict precisely because 
it implicates the ability of groups to perpetuate group customs and affiliations 
intergenerationally and the often very strongly held aversion to such intergenerational 
control in liberal societies.  There are very good reasons for liberal societies to prohibit 
marriages involving children unable to make autonomous decisions and to encourage 
people to socialize across of ethnically-defined lines.  While ethnic sub groups are 
entitled to promote group solidarity through voluntary association, it is not at all clear 
that they are entitled to hinder younger generations from considering and pursuing 
alternative affiliations, lifestyles and relationships outside the group.   An inevitable and 
perhaps desirable result of growing up in a multicultural society will be the gradual 
erosion of some of the most distinctive elements of ethnic group culture and the 
supplementation of ethnic group affiliations with new, more cosmopolitan modes of 
action, beliefs and ways of life.   
It’s precisely the possibility of this type of slow erosion of group identity that many 
would like to forestall with cultural rights.  It seems to me such desires, while 
understandable, are not desires liberal societies can accommodate.  And perhaps it bears 
noting that even this characteristic demand of cultural difference is, in one sense, not 
unique to cultural minorities.  Parents everywhere and of all races, creeds and classes, 
desperately wish for more control over their children than modern, dynamic, 
cosmopolitan and liberal societies can offer or are prepared to yield to them.    
Multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism are increasingly the conditions of our age.     
We will do better to confront and manage the conflicts that arise with compassion, equity 
and pragmatism than to attempt to banish them with absolutes, be it rigid prohibitions or 
indiscriminate accommodations and entitlements. 
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